Maurer School of Law: Indiana University

Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty

Faculty Scholarship

2018

Wayfair: Marketplaces and Foreign Vendors
David Gamage
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, dgamage@indiana.edu

Adam Thimmesch
University of Nebraska - Lincoln

Darien Shanske
University of California, Davis

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Taxation-Federal Commons, and the Taxation-State and Local Commons

Recommended Citation
Gamage, David; Thimmesch, Adam; and Shanske, Darien, "Wayfair: Marketplaces and Foreign Vendors"
(2018). Articles by Maurer Faculty. 2722.
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2722

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by
Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please
contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
state tax notes®
Wayfair: Marketplaces and Foreign Vendors
by Adam Thimmesch, Darien Shanske, and David Gamage
decision and to analyze key questions it has
raised.2
In this article, we consider issues regarding
marketplaces such as Amazon.com and eBay and
foreign vendors. We conclude that state
governments should apply their new nexus
standards to the major marketplaces and should
not let fears about in-state citizens shifting to
purchasing from foreign vendors stand in the way
of efforts to apply more inclusive nexus standards
to out-of-state vendors.
Marketplaces
Adam Thimmesch is
a professor at the
University of Nebraska
College of Law; Darien
Shanske is a professor
at the University of
California, Davis,
School of Law (King
Hall); and David
Gamage is a professor
of law at Indiana
University Maurer
School of Law.
In this installment of
Academic Perspectives on SALT, the third of a
series of articles on Wayfair, the authors offer
suggestions for how states can enforce their
sales and use tax laws against marketplaces and
foreign sellers.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in
South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc. is perhaps the most
important development in state and local tax law
1
in the past decade. This is the third in a series of
articles we have written to evaluate the Wayfair

1

South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
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Wayfair is already ushering in a new regime
for interstate sales and use tax transactions
wherein state governments should be able to
successfully tax most transactions between instate citizens and out-of-state vendors. However,
for this new regime to be successful, it is critical
for state governments to reach sales by small outof-state vendors conducted through the major
marketplaces like Amazon and eBay.
As we have previously discussed, there are
limits to the extent Wayfair allows state
governments to impose collection obligations on
3
out-of-state vendors. Importantly, the Court
explained that it was upholding South Dakota’s
law in part because that law provided a
“reasonable degree of protection” for smaller
vendors by exempting out-of-state vendors that
deliver less than $100,000 of goods or services into
the state or engage in less than 200 separate
transactions for the delivery of goods or services
4
into the state on an annual basis.

2

The two prior articles are Adam Thimmesch, Darien Shanske, and
David Gamage, “Wayfair: Substantial Nexus and Undue Burden,” State
Tax Notes, July 30, 2018, p. 447 (“Undue Burden”); and Thimmesch,
Shanske, and Gamage, “Wayfair: Sales Tax Formalism and Income Tax
Nexus,” State Tax Notes, Sept. 3, 2018, p. 975 (“Tax Nexus”).
3

Id.,“Undue Burden.”
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Major marketplaces such as Amazon, eBay,
and Google will certainly facilitate sales that, in
the aggregate, exceed small vendor thresholds of
this sort. But this then raises the question whether
states can require these marketplaces to collect
sales or use tax on transactions between in-state
consumers and small out-of-state vendors that are
themselves protected from having to collect that
tax. If not, the result would be to create a
substantial tax advantage for small out-of-state
vendors selling via the major marketplaces as
compared with their larger competitors. Because
there is already an abundance of small vendors
selling through these marketplaces and there are
many more small retail vendors that could easily
set up similar operations to make interstate sales,
this would likely create major gaps in the new
interstate sales and use tax regime.
Although Wayfair does not specifically
address marketplaces, we see nothing in that
decision that should prevent state governments
from imposing sales and use tax obligations on
the major marketplaces. We thus urge state
governments to clearly apply their new nexus
standards to the major marketplaces.
Of course, states will have to carefully
consider how they will define the marketplaces
that are subject to these new requirements.
Marketplaces come in many different forms.
Some are run by companies that make sales
themselves, like Amazon. Those companies have
tax collection processes in place and are already
subject to state tax collection obligations. On the
other end of the spectrum are marketplaces like
Craigslist or Facebook Marketplace. Those
marketplaces do not sell their own goods, do not
facilitate payments, and generally cater to sellers
who are making casual or isolated sales that are
likely exempt from tax. Somewhere in the middle
of the spectrum is a marketplace like eBay, which
takes an active role in facilitating sales and
payments, has a well-developed website that
guides consumers to particular goods and
retailers, and is a platform often used for sales by
businesses.
States with marketplace facilitator laws on the
books have thus far conditioned their tax

collection obligations on different factors. In
Connecticut and Pennsylvania, for example, the
marketplace facilitator must participate, directly
5
or indirectly, in the payment for the good. The
statutes in Washington and Alabama look at a
variety of other factors that involve the
marketplace facilitator in the sale to some degree,
including the provision of fulfillment services,
price setting, branding, and return assistance,
6
among others.
We believe that states are well within their
powers to require companies like Amazon to
collect tax on sales that are made using its
platform. States are also on firm footing if they
want to require the collection of tax by vendors
like eBay that take an active role in promoting and
facilitating sales, including by facilitating
payments and returns and by providing moneyback guarantees to those who use its platform.
State power regarding passive marketplaces like
Facebook Marketplace or Craigslist is less certain,
but it seems that states have less of an interest in
pursuing those marketplaces. Many of the sales
taking place on those platforms, though certainly
not all, will likely be tax exempt under states’
casual or isolated sales exemptions. We suggest
that states focus their efforts on the first two
marketplace categories but closely monitor the
development and evolution of other types of
marketplaces.
Foreign Vendors
There is broad consensus that the Wayfair
decision about nexus also applies to remote sellers
7
based in foreign countries. That is, assuming a
state nexus statute passes the Wayfair regime, a
non-U.S. vendor must collect and remit the sales
8
or use tax on the same terms as a U.S. vendor.

5

Conn. Pub. Acts No. 18-152 stat 4 (2018); and 72 Penn. Stat. 7213(c).

6

Ala. Act 2018-529 section 3; and Wash. Rev. Code section
82.13.010(3).
7

See, e.g., William Hoke, “Enforceability of Wayfair Decision on
Foreign Companies Unclear,”[italicized Wayfair in title because it’s
italicized on TN website] State Tax Notes, July 2, 2018, p. 73; and Deloitte,
“State Tax Implications of Wayfair for Non-U.S. Companies With U.S.
Customers,” External Multistate Tax Alert (June 27, 2018).
8

4
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Id.

We refer to use taxes in the remainder of this article, but it may be
that states will impose their sales taxes on foreign sales instead. As we
discussed in a prior article, this may be significant, and the foreign
dimension may raise issues that have not yet been considered.
Thimmesch, Gamage, and Shanske, “Tax Nexus,” supra note 2.
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Imposing a use tax obligation on foreign
sellers implicates both the foreign dormant
commerce clause and the import-export clause.
Nevertheless, it seems hard to imagine that any
state law that passes muster under Wayfair could
offend either of these provisions. In either case,
and painting in broad strokes, the state law would
only likely fail under these provisions if state
collection efforts antagonized our trading
partners in such a way that the federal
government would take the side of foreign
vendors in litigation, but without Congress
9
passing a law preempting state collection efforts.
Commentators have wisely been much more
concerned about whether and how states are
going to get foreign vendors to collect use tax in
10
the first place. The consensus seems to be that
enforcement could be a problem, both legally and
practically. If this consensus is correct, then there
is a further empirical question whether the result
will be an uneven playing field between domestic
and foreign vendors.
Let us start with the legal analysis. It is likely
correct that states are not going to have much luck
getting foreign governments to enforce their use
11
tax collection obligations under current law.
Some analyses seem to imply that this is basically
the end of the matter, but this is not so. A state can
surely impose a tax lien on any property that the
non-collecting vendor has in the state, for
instance. For many states, such as New York with
its banks, and California with its ports, this will
likely be a significant aid in enforcement.
But what if the foreign vendor does not have
property in the state? Again, the suggestion seems
to be that if there is no property in the state, then
the state is out of luck, but that too is incorrect. If
a state takes the trouble of getting its tax lien

reduced to a judgment in its own courts and then
follows the procedures of the Uniform
12
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, then the
state can enforce its judgments in the courts of
another state.13 Forms of the foreign judgments act
14
have been passed in 49 states. In other words,
Ohio can collect from a foreign vendor by
enforcing its judgment against the funds it holds
in a New York bank.
To be sure, this process could be burdensome
and states do not typically go to this much trouble
15
— but sometimes they do, and in any event they
would have enormous incentive to do so if the
feared shift to foreign vendors were to occur. In
short, we think that states will have considerable
enforcement power if the shift to foreign vendors
is significant enough to warrant such an effort.
As an empirical matter, we don’t expect there
to be a need for a large number of cross-state
enforcement actions. We say this for several
reasons beyond our legal analysis as to state
power. First, as discussed previously, states
almost certainly can and should impose collection
obligations on major marketplaces like Amazon
and eBay. This should greatly reduce the scope for
foreign vendors to sell to in-state customers while
evading collection obligations. Second, businessto-business use tax compliance rates are high,16 so
we are only concerned with direct sales to
consumers. Third, the shift of sales to smaller
foreign vendors does not present any unique
12

See generally C. Joseph Lennihan, “Cross-Border Collection of State
Tax Assessments: A Primer,”[double check title of article? he lists it as
“Enforcement” rather than “Collection” on his LinkedIn] 19 J. Multistate
Tax’n & Incentives 8 (2009).
13

The key Supreme Court decision establishing that states must
enforce each other’s judgments under the full faith and credit clause is
Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935). Note that this
case was about a county in Wisconsin attempting to enforce a tax
judgment in Illinois.
14

9

As happened in Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434
(1979), but not Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S.
159 (1983). See also Leanne M. Wilson, “The Fate of the Dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause After Garamendi and Crosby,” 107 Colum. L. Rev. 746
(2007) (arguing that the key test involves a preemption analysis in light
of nontax cases decided after Container).
10

See Hoke, supra note 7. See also Ryan Prete, “Foreign Sellers Likely
Safe From State Online Tax Frenzy Post-Wayfair,” Bloomberg Tax, July 12,
2018.
11

Restatement (Fourth) Foreign Relations section 489; Brian J. Kirkell
and Mo Bell-Jacobs, “E-Flight Risk? Wayfair and the Revenue Rule,” State
Tax Notes, Aug. 6, 2018, p. 551. This is not to say that governments could
not and should not change this state of affairs. William S. Dodge,
“Breaking the Public Law Taboo,” 43 Harv. Int’l. Law J. 161 (2002).
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See Lennihan, supra note 12; see also Uniform Law Commission,
“Act: Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act.”
15

For instance, there are numerous cases involving New York trying
to enforce judgments in Florida. See, e.g., New York State Commissioner of
Taxation and Finance v. Hayward, 902 So.2d 309, 310 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2005). For an example of a local government successfully enforcing a
judgment, see City of Philadelphia v. Austin, 86 N.J. 55, 56, 429 A.2d 568
(1981). For examples of businesses using the act to collect from other
businesses, see Sheldon H. Laskin, “The Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments: A Government Service Designed to Benefit Nonresidents,”
State Tax Notes, Jan. 7, 2008, p. 41.
16

See, e.g., California State Board of Equalization, “Revenue Estimate:
Electronic Commerce and Mail Order Sales, Rev. 8/13,” at 9 (2013)
(“Through one means or another BOE believes that registered sales and
use tax is paid on 90 percent of California taxable B-to-B electronic
commerce.”).
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enforcement problem for states given the legal
and administrative need for small-seller
exemptions. It is just that it will always be difficult
for states to collect use tax on sales made by
smaller vendors, regardless of where they are
located.
Fourth, the form of goods arguably most
susceptible to evasion — digital goods — does not
strike us as relatively problematic for states. This
is because digital goods, though growing in
importance, are still only a small slice of the
market. Also, many common business-toconsumer digital goods are sold through
platforms that can clearly be targeted for
enforcement, such as the Apple App Store,
Google Play, Netflix, and Amazon Prime Video.
And if a foreign vendor attempted to operate
independently of these platforms, it would still
need to establish a payment mechanism to collect
revenue from U.S. customers. Any sizeable
foreign firm would likely want to access the U.S.
capital markets, creating another opportunity for
states to collect.
Fifth, although the potential price advantage
from not collecting the use tax is real and
substantial, we think that many of the
commentators concerned about “e-flight”
exaggerate the cost of use tax compliance in the
same way that many remote vendors did preWayfair. Not only would the compliance costs for
a foreign vendor with sales above the thresholds
set by the states likely face a small cost relative to
the value of its sales, but these compliance cost
will not likely stand out relative to the compliance
costs associated with other consumption taxes.
For instance, consider a Canadian vendor. At
the national level, Canada has a credit-invoice
VAT that is, on its own, at least as complex as any
state’s retail sales tax, if not more so.17 If the
Canadian vendor sells abroad, then it already
must cope with border tax adjustments (BTAs)
because basically every other country on earth has
a VAT, and BTAs are a standard part of a VAT.

Once in the new jurisdiction, the foreign vendor
will again need to deal with a VAT, assuming it is
18
making sales in the foreign country itself.
Further, there is a significant body of literature
to the effect that businesses generally want to
comply with the law. This is not just a matter of
altruism, but good sense for the business and for
19
the individual managers. A large state tax
liability will show up on financial statements and
will hover over any future plans to operate in the
20
United States. It seems improbable that large
vendors are likely to just ignore the laws of states
in which they make substantial sales. Remember
that in the pre-Wayfair world, big businesses like
Wayfair were complying with current law when
not remitting the use tax. In the new post-Wayfair
world, this will no longer be the case.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, if a
shift to foreign sellers ends up being a large
problem, despite the reasons we explained above
to think this will not be the case, then we would
expect Congress to intervene on the side of the
states. After all, this would be a situation in which
all U.S. domestic vendors would be at a
disadvantage — we would not have the same
issue as regarding the Quill rule, under which the
interests of different states diverged based on
whether they had a sales tax.
For these reasons, we do not expect that
foreign sellers will create any major gaps in the
new post-Wayfair sales and use tax enforcement
regime. State governments should not let fears
about in-state citizens shifting to purchasing from
foreign vendors stand in the way of efforts to
apply more encompassing nexus standards for
imposing collection obligations on out-of-state
vendors.


18

17

See, e.g., Sebastian Eichfelder and François Vaillancourt, “Tax
Compliance Costs: A Review of Cost Burdens and Cost Structures,” at 28
(Nov. 2014 draft) (“VAT seems to be significantly more costly than more
simple sales taxes.”). Many Canadian provinces also have their own
consumption taxes. On the complicated system in Canada generally, see
Richard M. Bird and Pierre-Pascal Gendron, “Sales Taxes in Canada: The
GST-HST-QST-RST ‘System,’” 63 Tax L. Rev. 517 (2010).

21

Foreign countries generally have de minimis rules that protect
smaller vendors from VAT obligations, but the threshold amounts vary
considerably. Emily Ann Satterthwaite, “On the Threshold: Smallness
and the Value Added Tax,” 9 Colum. Tax L.J. 177, 194-195 (2018).
19

See Wei Cui, “Taxation Without Information: The Institutional
Foundations of Modern Tax Collection,” 20 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 93-146 (2017).
20

Kirkell and Bell-Jacobs (supra note 11) make this point.
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